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21. Introduction
The wage determination process is one of the most studied areas of empirical labour
economics. Despite continuing work in this area, long-standing questions concerning
the extent of downward nominal rigidity, an issue of fundamental importance to labour
economics and industrial relations, remain. If pervasive, such rigidity would interfere
with the functioning of the labour market, preventing the eﬃcient re-allocation of labour
from low to high-demand areas and inducing quantity adjustments and unemployment.
Should nominal rigidity be more prevalent in some sectors than in others, similar shocks
will have diﬀerent price and quantity eﬀects. For instance, if unions are more resistant
to wage cuts than the non-union sector, real wage realignment may be more diﬃcult
to achieve in the union sector. This will be all the more so at times of low inﬂation
because then inﬂation cannot ‘grease’ the wheels of the labour market.1 Thus, recently
achieved, exceptionally low, levels of inﬂation in countries such as Canada may have
been attained at the expense of higher unemployment. Under these circumstances,
low-inﬂation regimes may inject new sources of stress in industrial relations. These ar-
guments suggest that more information on the extent and pattern of downward nominal
rigidity would be valuable.
In conventional Keynesian models, downward rigidity is ‘eﬀective’ when the real wage
is too high, employment is on the labour demand curve, and unemployment prevails.
Then shocks which raise the price level and lower the real wage increase employment.
Thus, early attempts to gauge the severity of downward nominal rigidity were macroeco-
nomic in nature and investigated whether the real wage is countercyclical. Papers from
Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939) to Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) and Abraham
and Haltiwanger (1995) are in this tradition and a variety of results are available.
However, a new literature stemming partly from the availability of data at the mi-
1See Shultze (1959), Samuelson and Solow (1960) and Tobin (1972).
3cro level has emerged.2 These studies typically start by constructing the cross-sectional
nominal wage-change distributions from data such as the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics or the Current Population Survey. Annual histograms are then used to study
features of interest such as whether the mass to the left of zero is deﬁcient relative
to a no downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) counterfactual, whether spikes at
zero can be identiﬁed, the extent to which holes around zero may suggest the presence
of ‘menu costs’, and whether wage-change distributions may be diﬀerent in periods of
high and low inﬂation. Issues of concern center around the extent to which periods of
suﬃciently low inﬂation have been examined, the role of recall, measurement, timing,
and rounding errors inherent in these surveys, the extent to which the visual evidence
presented amounts to statistical tests, and whether such tests are best conducted using
parametric or non-parametric techniques.
Parallel with this literature has been work3 that seeks the reasons for nominal rigid-
ity by interviewing the individuals who ought to know, e.g. executives and labour
leaders. Bewley (1999) suggests that nominal wage cuts are shunned because of their
likely impact on morale and that this is all the more likely where information ﬂows
are good. Bewley (1999) ﬁnds that, in the ‘primary’ sector4, new employees are more
likely to be hired at rates comparable to those of existing employees than is the case in
the ‘secondary’ sector where short-term employees, often part-time, abound. This work
2The US literature includes, inter alia, McLaughlin (1994), Lebow, Stocton and Wascher (1995),
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), Card and Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), Altonji and Devereux (1999),
Groshen and Schweitzer (1999), Lebow, Sacks and Wilson (1999) and McLaughlin (1999a, b). Smith
(1999) studies experience in the UK, Beissinger and Knoppik (2000) that in West Germany, and Fehr
and Gotte (2000) that in Switzerland. The extant Canadian literature is reviewed below.
3See Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), Campell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley
(1999).
4‘Primary-sector personnel include most factory, clerical, and secretarial workers, technical, profes-
sional, and managerial employees with permanent positions, and salespeople in stores and restaurants
with regular customers whom the staﬀ should know on a ﬁrst-name basis.’ Bewley (1999, p. 18).
4suggests that the incidence of downward nominal rigidity should be most apparent in
situations where long-term relations between a ﬁrm and its employees exist, where work-
ers are organized into bargaining units where ‘bad news travels fast’ and particularly so
when the bargaining unit is a union whose very existence and modus operandi stress,
as in Oswald (1993), wages over employment and the prevention of outcomes such as
nominal pay cuts. Some studies based on survey data have distinguished between the
behaviour of union and non-union workers and some evidence has been provided that
more rigidity exists in the union sector.5
A good source of information on outcomes in the union sector is collective bar-
gaining agreements themselves. Detailed data on the provisions of Canadian collective
bargaining agreements are compiled by Human Resources Development Canada, the
federal agency in charge of industrial relations. These are legally binding documents
whose provisions are recorded and distributed electronically by federal authorities. We
refer to information from this source as the ‘contract data’. One of the controversies
surrounding survey data is the extent to which recall, measurement, rounding and tim-
ing errors my exist.6 These concerns apply to a far lesser extent to the contract data
because of the regulatory environment under which this information is collected. In
addition, the Canadian data is available over a long period of time which includes peri-
ods of high inﬂation, a period of substantially reduced inﬂation, as well a period during
which inﬂation was exceptionally low and much lower than in the US. Thus, the issue
of whether periods of exceptionally low inﬂation have been available for study does not
arise either. Contract data also make it possible to examine the role of Cost-of-Living-
Allowance (COLA) clauses as a means of built-in nominal wage ﬂexibility. Information
5For instance, McLaughlin (1999a, p. 129) ﬁnds that ‘... the skewness of union workers’ wage changes
is all atributable to nominal rigidity’.
6For the signiﬁcance of these issues for the size of the spike at zero in the context of British data,
see Smith (1999).
5from survey data does not apportion wage change to its contingent and non-contingent
parts.
While stressing the advantages of contract data, it is important to also be aware of
certain drawbacks. There are no reporting requirements for the formal and informal
agreements reached in the non-union sector and similar information on that important
part of the economy is not available. Where labour is supplied on the basis of informal
arrangements, nominal wages may be adjusted at intervals which are less rigid than
is the case in the union sector. Moreover, worker duties may be easily re-assigned,
thereby securing nominal wage ﬂexibility that would be more diﬃcult, or impossible,
to attain in the union sector. Finally, the contract data do not cover small bargaining
units and refer to bargaining units rather than the earnings of particular individuals.
These problems suggest that, while it is important to examine the extent of downward
nominal wage rigidity in contract data, our ﬁndings may not generalize to the labour
market as a whole.
In this paper we use a recently released version of the Canadian contract ﬁle to study
the implied distributions of nominal wage change over the period 1976-1999. To that
end, we use a variety of parametric and non-parametric techniques and statistical tests.
Some other studies also use the Canadian contract data in this general context. Fortin
(1996) argues that the Canadian recession of the early 1990s was deeper in Canada
than in the US because of the conjunction of lower inﬂation and downward nominal
rigidity. This last claim is based on 1992-94 histograms of only the ﬁrst year of wage
settlements, a procedure criticized by Freedman and Maclem (1998). Simpson, Cameron
and Hum (1998) estimate the increase in the unemployment rate that would be needed
to moderate wage inﬂation by the amount attributed to wage rigidity. Their conclusion
that this could be as high as 2% is questioned by Fares and Hogan (2000). Fares
and Lemieux (2000) also focus on the macroeconomic consequences of nominal rigidity.
Crawford and Harrison (1998) present histograms of nominal wage change in private
6and public sector union contracts. They calculate the skewness coeﬃcients at times of
high, medium and low inﬂation. Surprisingly, these coeﬃcients become more negative
at times of low inﬂation. In their interesting piece, Crawford and Harrison (1998) also
apply hazard methods to their data and investigate whether the wage-change hazard
depends negatively on the rate of inﬂation.
In section 2, we discuss the data set used and its basic features. In section 3,
we comment on salient features of the annual histograms constructed. In section 4,
we consider the implied degree of nominal rigidity using a variety of test procedures.
Finally, in section 5, we present a summary of our results and our conclusions.
2. Data Sources
Wage agreements in the unionized sector are monitored by Human Resources Devel-
opment Canada (HRDC) who made available to us7 detailed, monthly, ﬁles containing
information on provisions for 10947 wage contracts signed in the Canadian unionized
sector, both public and private, between 1976 and 1999. Because reporting requirements
apply, this information is very accurate. We detected inconsistencies in only two con-
tracts and these were excluded from the sample. The raw, monthly, ﬁle was processed
to extract the information needed for the purposes of this study including the unique
identifying code number for each contract, relevant dates8, wage change that was due to
7We are indebted to Michel Legault of HRDC for providing us with the raw, monthly, data ﬁle.
8These include the settlement, eﬀective and expiry date of each contract. The eﬀective date is used
to date contracts in the histograms below. Of the 2743 contracts settled before the eﬀective date, 2337
(or 85.2%) were signed within three months of the eﬀective date. Of the 8202 contracts settled after
the eﬀective date, 3220 (or 39.3%) were signed within three months of the eﬀective date. Thus, most
contracts are signed within a window of three months around the eﬀective date. Contracts settled
after the eﬀective date include ones involving disputes, or even strikes, and in some cases the diﬀerence
between the settlement and eﬀective dates can be quite long.
7a COLA clause and wage adjustment that was not contingent, as well as the duration9
and sector10 of each agreement.
The resulting data base involves settlements which range in duration from a few
months to several years, and covers bargaining units involving 200 to nearly 80,000
employees.11 The average base wage rate paid to entry-level workers is $12.40 at the
beginning and $13.49 at the end of these agreements, implying a rate of change of 8.79%.
Since mean duration is approximately two years, the annual rate of wage adjustment
is approximately 4.4%. The increase in the base wage rate is, on average, $1.09 and
it consists of a $0.97 non-contingent increase and a $0.12 contingent increase through
a COLA clause. Very few contracts contain COLA clauses12. We pursue our analysis
using two deﬁnitions of wage adjustment, that is one that includes COLA adjustments13
9Contract duration is deﬁned as the expiry minus the eﬀective date. Average duration increases
gently throughout the period under study and there is no tendency for wage ﬂexibility to be attained
via more frequent contract negotiations.
10The private-public sector distinction is based on a code in the employer ﬁle supplied to us. The
public sector includes contracts in public administration, health, education, and utilities.
11In 1999, union membership as a proportion to non-agricultural paid workers was 0.32. The Work-
place Gazette reports that agreements signed in 1998 covered 916,900 employees and those in 1999
covered 797,600 employees - see Human Resources Development Canada (2000, p.23). Since average
contract duration is just over two years, the sum of these numbers as a ratio to the Canadian labour
force (15,570,000 is the average for 1998 and 1999) is equal to 0.11. This number constitutes a lower
bound on the proportion of the labour force covered by similar agreements because the data set used
does not include agreements involving less than 200 employees.
12The nature, incidence, and intensity of COLA clauses and their implications, particularly for
modelling wage adjustment, are analyzed in, inter alia, Card (1983,1986), Christoﬁdes (1987,1990),
Cousineau, Lacroix and Bilodeau (1983), Ehrenbrerg, Danziger and San (1984), Hendricks and Kahn
(1985), Kaufman and Woglom (1984), Mitchell (1980), and Vroman (1984).
13For most contracts, the yield on COLA clauses is calculated by quantifying the detailed provisions of
each clause using actual CPI information. These clauses are complex and involve a variety of formulas,
e.g. cents per point change in the CPI, percentage changes in wages following percentage changes in
the CPI, combinations of these two, triggers and caps. In the case of contracts which were still in eﬀect
8and one that does not. Clearly, less rigidity will be displayed by the former series. It
should be noted, however, that because the incidence and intensity of COLA clauses
is limited, the results are not very sensitive to this distinction. To conserve space, the
histograms in Figure 1 below refer only to the series which includes COLA adjustment
as this is likely to provide a more complete characterization, but histograms based on
the alternative deﬁnition are very similar and are available on request. In this paper,
wage change refers to what the negotiating parties implement over the whole contract at
annual rates and appears in our sample as one observation for each contract.14 Contract
re-openers, lump-sum payments15 and proﬁt-sharing are very rare and are not taken into
account.
Table 1 below contains, for each year,16 the number of all contracts, as well as the
number of contracts by sector and contract duration. A total of 10945 contracts are
spread over the 21 ‘years’ in Table 1, with a low of 226 contracts in 1977 and a high of
676 contracts in 1984. Because of the broad deﬁnition of the public sector, it includes
more agreements than does the private sector. Considerably more contracts are long
than short and the modal length is two years. The last four columns in Table 1 provide
when the data base was constructed, the CPI was projected to increase at the rate of 2% per annum, a
fairly realistic assumption as it transpired.
14An alternative approach involves deﬁning sub-periods of the contract and establishing wage adjust-
ment over each of these. For a discussion of this issue, see Fortin (1996) and Freedman and Macklem
(1998). We prefer the current speciﬁcation because it summarises the overall intentions of the contract.
See the information in footnote 17.
15There may be a concern that lump-sum payments may circumvent apparent nominal rigidities,
particularly where nominal wage freezes or reductions are involved. This is not the case: Among
the 102 contracts involving nominal wage reductions, only 0.98% involved a lump-sum increase. This
percentage was 4.82% and 6.11% in the case of freeezes and wage increases respectively. There is no
information on the data base regarding the size of lump-sum payments.
16Because of the smaller number of contracts, the ﬁrst two and the last three years in the sample are
considered together in everything that follows.
9the annual C ˙ PI a n dab r e a k d o w no f ˙ W by its sign. In most years, the number of
agreements involving negative wage change over the life of a contract17 is negligible.
The number of freezes reaches its maximum in the low inﬂation year of 1993, when 51%
of the agreements signed entailed no wage adjustment. Further descriptive statistics,
including the rate of price inﬂation as well as mean and median wage adjustment appear
in Table 2 below. Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 are considered in detail in the next section.
3. Features of Wage-Change Distributions
Figure 1 presents wage-adjustment histograms for each of the 21 year groups in the
sample. In constructing these, care was taken to centre the bins on zero.18 During
the high-inﬂation years of 1977 to around 1983, the histograms are centered well to
the right of zero. They are reasonably symmetric and display no pronounced spikes at
zero. A substantial portion of the wage settlements in each year imply negative real
adjustments which can be quantitatively important. For instance, in 1978 when the
annual C ˙ PI inﬂation rate was 8.01% (column 6, Table 1), the average change in the
CPI over the life of all contracts which became eﬀective in that year ( ˙ P in column 1,
Table 2) was 9.93%, and the average wage change including COLA was 8.16%, most
contracts entailed real wage reductions, some of which were as high as about 10%. The
17The intra-contract behaviour of the nominal wage rate is fairly regular, with most agreements being
front-loaded. For instance, one-year contracts involving positive wage change have 88.6% of all nominal
wage adjustment occur in the ﬁrst month of the agreement. The percentages for two-year contracts
are 39.7% in the ﬁrst and 53.5% in the thirteenth month of the contract respectively. However, some
agreements display surprising intra-contract variation: For instance, one-year agreements involving a
nominal wage cut on average have deeper cuts in the ﬁrst month than in the contract as a whole. This
suggests (i) that survey data which must reﬂect the montly remuneration may contain noise, that is
nominal wage changes which are later reversed and (ii) that characterising the wage change in a contract
using arbitrary sub-periods may not accurately reﬂect the overall intentions of the agreement.
18That is, the zero interval is -0.5 to 0.49999. Intervals increase and decrease in 1% units.
10average real wage change for contracts which became eﬀective in 1978 (MRW in column
2, Table 2) was -1.81% with a standard deviation (SDRW in column 3, Table 2) of 2.7%.
Only 102 of the 10945 contracts studied involved nominal wage reductions. Between
1980-83, the real wage change over the life of eﬀective contracts was on average positive
but, as Figure 1 in combination with column 1 in Table 2 show, many contracts entailed
negative real adjustments. It is noteworthy that the standard deviation of the real wage
rate SDRW was very high (e.g. 3.38% in 1981) during this period. This reﬂects the
wide domain over which real wage change will range during high-inﬂation periods.
When the annual C ˙ PI (column 6, Table 1)19 began to abate after 1982, but before
the late 1980s when average real wages (MRW in Table 2) began to increase again,
the general appearance of the histograms changes noticeably: In this period, they are
generally characterized by noteworthy mass and censoring at zero, no nominal wage
decreases and strong asymmetries. In 1987, MRW was -0.75% and SDRW was 1.76%,
both lower than in 1978, a year of much higher price inﬂation. This pattern of down-
ward rigidity combined with a reduced scope for real wage reductions achieved through
nominal freezes or small increases will be seen even more clearly in the low inﬂation
period at the end of the sample.
During 1988-90, average wage adjustment (column 5, Table 2) increased and, in
1989-90, actually exceeded
·
P on average (Table 2). Histograms for these three years are
quite symmetric and the descent to zero reasonably smooth. Despite the fact that wage
and price inﬂation are considerably lower during 1988-90 than during 1977-82, these
histograms are similar in general appearance to that for 1978, for example, and seem
to have been substantially inﬂuenced by the easing of labour market conditions. This
experience suggests a capacity for this labour market to operate smoothly at inﬂation
rates in the region of 4%.
19Note that since contract duration spans a number of years, ˙ P in column 1, Table 2, begins to decline
earlier than C ˙ PI in Table 1.
11After 1990, wage and price inﬂation declined to levels which are unprecedented in
recent decades and much lower than those in the US. It is histograms like those for 1991
and 1992 (but based on ﬁrst-year wage change only) that led Fortin (1996) to argue that
extensive nominal wage rigidity was present in the Canadian economy. These histograms
display considerable mass and very strong censoring at zero. The concentration of mass
at zero is so pronounced that even though ˙ P was extremely low, a very substantial
proportion of contracts experienced real wage declines. Indeed, during 1993-96, the
average real wage change, MRW, was negative. Naturally, the extent, as opposed to
the incidence, of real wage reductions was limited by the fact that CPI inﬂation was
exceptionally low; most real wage reductions were of the order of 1-2% and SDRW
declined to its minimum of 1.2% in 1995. Nominal wage reductions were the exception
rather than the rule, though it should be noted that, in the exceptional year of 1994,
53 contracts involved nominal wage reductions (column 7, Table 1). It is noteworthy
that 38 of these were in Alberta and 37 were in Alberta’s public sector, reﬂecting the
province’s political outlook at the time. The remaining 15 contracts were distributed
over four other provinces but only 3 of these were in the private sector. Thus, to the
extent that contracts involving wage cuts exemplify the absence of downward nominal
rigidity, this was not achieved in the private sector.
It is also noteworthy that some of the cuts experienced during 1994 were ‘undone’ in
the next contract signed by these pairs. The average wage increase in the next contract
signed by the 51 (out of the 53) extant bargaining pairs was 1.74%, higher than the
average of 0.43% achieved in the 178 contracts which had freezes in 1994, and the 1.65%
achieved in the 200 contracts that had positive wage adjustment in 1994 - note that
the sum of 51, 178 and 200 is smaller than the 471 contracts shown for 1994 in Table
1 because some of the latter did not have a subsequent contract. A similar analysis for
1993 reveals that of the 18 contracts with a wage freeze, the 17 extant pairs achieved
an average wage increase in their next contract equal to 0.93%, a ﬁgure higher than
12the 0.28% agreed to by the 254 extant (out of 263) bargaining pairs which imposed a
wage freeze. However, the pairs which had wage increases during 1993, had the highest
average settlement during the next contract.
One would expect that nominal wage rigidity would be stronger when ˙ W is deﬁned,
as in the rightmost part of Table 2, to exclude COLA adjustments. MRW is algebraically
larger with COLA than without. However, the eﬀect of indexation is very small. In
1994, for example, there is only one more observation (54) involving a wage cut when
COLA is excluded and the number of wage freezes is 186 with COLA included and 196
with COLA excluded.
The apparent absence of nominal wage reductions from the histograms of Figure
1, may raise the concern that the zero bin (i.e. the -0.5 to 0.4999 bin) may hide a
substantial number of very small nominal wage reductions. This is not the case. Most
of the mass in the zero bin is at zero itself (see columns 7-9, Table 1) and there are few
wage cuts in this or in lower bins for that matter.
The review of the evidence above shows clearly that nominal wage rates in wage con-
tracts are downwardly rigid and that, when wage cuts occurred, they were concentrated
in the public sector and tended to be undone in subsequent contracts. Our discussion
also suggests that much more substantial real wage reductions can be achieved by de-
fault (i.e. through nominal freezes) during high than low inﬂation periods. One suspects
that, unless a case can be made that the need for real wage realignment is lower during
periods of low inﬂation, this reduced scope for real wage reductions may have some im-
pact on the smooth functioning of the labour market. It is important, therefore, to turn
to some more formal statistical tests of features of interest in the nominal wage-change
distributions.
134. Test Statistics and Econometric Results
4.1. Introduction and Descriptive Statistics
One feature of the new literature dealing with nominal wage rigidity is its concern with
the symmetry of the wage-change distribution. During a period of high inﬂation, the
nominal wage change distribution may be symmetric around some measure of inﬂation
plus average productivity growth. By contrast, when for given average productivity
growth inﬂation is low, some sectoral shocks may require decreases in nominal wage
rates. If there is downward nominal wage rigidity, then wage-change distributions
m a yd i s p l a yc o n s i d e r a b l em a s sa tz e r oa n db em o r ea s y m m e t r i ct h a ni np e r i o d so f
high inﬂation. Columns 4-6 and 10-12, Table 2, present descriptive statistics which
have been used to address this issue. In a right-skewed distribution, the mean will
exceed the median. This is actually the case in most periods, a fact which accords with
McLaughlin’s (1999a) conclusions. Similarly, the skewness coeﬃcients (‘Skew’) in Table
2 tend to be positive. Though they show no clear tendency to increase as inﬂation
abates, more formal, non-parametric, symmetry test results available on request and
based on Ahmad and Li (1997) show a clear trend towards asymmetry as inﬂation
subsides.20
Despite this evidence, symmetry tests may not provide a conclusive indication of
t h ep r e s e n c eo fD N W R .W h i l ea tt i m e so fl o wi n ﬂation DNWR is likely to induce asym-
metries, DNWR need not be the only cause of asymmetries. It is conceivable that
the distribution of sectoral productivity shocks is systematically altered by inﬂation so
that it is symmetric during high-inﬂation periods and asymmetric during low-inﬂation
periods. No theory or empirical evidence exis t so nt h i sp o i n t .As e c o n dp o s s i b l ec o m p l i -
20Christoﬁdes and Stengos (2001) conﬁrm this for paid workers using US data from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics.
14cation may be that some high-inﬂation distributions may themselves be asymmetric21.
A possible source of asymmetry in the nominal wage-change distribution even in high-
inﬂation periods is downward real wage rigidity. If present, it would censor the nominal
wage-change distribution at the rate of price inﬂation. However, as already seen, there
appears to be no evidence of downward real wage rigidity in the histograms of Figure 1.
Thus, while indications of increased asymmetries in wage-change distributions do not
prove the existence of DNWR, they are very suggestive and, in combination with other
arguments, symmetry tests may be convincing.
In the next sub-sections, we pay attention to speciﬁc areas of and points on the wage-
change distribution. In particular, we examine the area at and below zero, particularly
as it relates to a no rigidity counterfactual.
4.2. Tail Behaviour
A feature of nominal wage-change distributions that is of considerable interest is the
extent to which mass at and below zero is unusual relative to some benchmark. Card and
Hyslop (1997) assume that the area above the median may be used as the no-rigidity
counterfactual for the area below the median. They measure the extent of nominal
wage rigidity by subtracting an appropriate integral of this counterfactual area from
that of the actual density function to the left of the median. McLaughlin’s (1999a)
symmetrically diﬀerenced histograms are similar in spirit except that they refer to the
entire range of the distribution. Lebow, Stocton and Wascher (1995, p. 13) and Lebow,
Stockton and Wilson (1999, p. 5) propose tests that measure the diﬀerence between the
left and right-hand tails of the wage-change distribution.
Along similar lines, our own empirical measure b Dn (see the Appendix for details)
is used as a statistical, non-parametric, test of the extent to which the left-hand tail
21McLaughlin (1999a, 130) provides possible reasons for asymmetries. On the other hand, Card and
Hyslop (1997, 86) note that ‘... most conventional models of wage determination imply symmetry’.
15inclusive of zero and as measured by F(0) contains more mass than the equivalent right-
hand tail measured by [1 − F(2 × Median)].22 To appreciate the intuition and use of
this measure, imagine a symmetric distribution such as the normal. The median, which
coincides with the mean in the case of a symmetric distribution, divides the area under
this distribution in two. Since, for present purposes, the median is a positive number,
it is equal in distance from zero and the point 2 × Median. This latter point identiﬁes
a tail to its right which is exactly equal to the area below zero. Since, in a continuous
symmetric distribution, density at any one point is zero, [1 − F(2 × Median)] should
be approximately equal to F(0) and D =[ 1− F(2 × Median)] − F(0) should be close
to zero. As inﬂation decreases, if DNWR is not an issue, the wage-change distribution
shifts to the left without a change in shape, the similarity between the two tails still
holds and D continues to be close to zero.
However, if DNWR is prevalent, lower inﬂation will coincide with more mass piling
up at zero and there will be a deﬁcit in the area below zero relative to the area to
the right of the point 2 × Median. We refer to the thinning of the tail below zero
as relative DNWR to be distinguished from absolute D N W Rw h i c hi si n d i c a t e db ya
spike at zero. The test-statistic b Dn can be set up so as to identify both relative and
absolute DNWR by excluding zero and by focussing only on zero respectively. However,
since there are virtually no wage cuts in the contract data23, a statistic that excludes
zero would consistently indicate relative rigidity and would add little to what we have
22Note that [1 − F(2 × Median)] excludes the point 2 × Median while F(0) includes zero. In a
continuous distribution this is innocuous as mass at any one point is zero. However, given that in the
present empirical context mass at zero can be substantial, the inclusion of the point zero in F(0) requires
due care. The exclusion of the point 2 × Median from [1 − F(2 × Median)] is of less consequence as
mass at this point is negligible.
23Histograms, such as those in Figure 1, blur the distinction between relative and absolute DNWR
because the zero bin (-0.5 to 0.4999) includes modest wage cuts. However, as seen at the end of section
3, most of the mass in the zero bin is at zero itself and there are virtually no wage cuts in most years.
16already shown in the previous sections. Instead, we use b Dn as speciﬁed in the Appendix
to include the points 0 and 2 × Median. As already noted, in a symmetric context
a n di nt h ea b s e n c eo fD N W R , b Dn so speciﬁed should be close to zero and would be
insensitive to shifts of the wage-change distribution to the left, following decreases in
the rate of price inﬂation. Since, in the present context, there is essentially no mass
below zero, a value of b Dn close to zero would reﬂect the existence of substantial mass
at the point zero itself and would be a measure of absolute rigidity. A negative value
of b Dn would suggest even more concentration of mass at zero relative to the right tail.
This can occur as a right-skewed distribution shifts to the left when inﬂation abates.24
Thus, in what follows, we will be looking for indications of absolute DNWR in small
or negative values of b Dn,w h i l es i g n i ﬁcantly positive values would suggest a rejection of
absolute DNWR.
Columns 7 and 13, Table 2, indicate that the values of the calculated test-statistic b Dn
reﬂect very closely and provide a statistical basis for the visual evidence in Figure 1. To
begin with, in the high-inﬂation years, b Dn tends to have positive values, suggesting that
mass essentially at zero is small relative to the right-hand tail. During the low-inﬂation
years, beginning with the years of moderating inﬂation, b Dn becomes negative and is
usually signiﬁcantly negative. That is, the concetration of mass at zero is signiﬁcantly
larger than that in the right-hand tail.25 By 1995, for instance, the distribution that
includes COLA indicates that the left-hand side contains 11.72 percentage points more
mass than the counterfactual, right-hand, tail. As can be seen from Table 1, most of
this mass (162 observations) is at zero and only 9 contracts entail nominal wage cuts.
The tendency for b Dn to decline algebraically as inﬂation decreases is shown clearly
in Figure 2. The top line in Figure 2 plots the average rate of inﬂation prevailing over
24As already noted, the wage-change distributions in this data tend to be skewed to the right.
25Note that when the median of the wage-change distribution is itself zero, as in 1993-94, the b Dn
statistic is not deﬁned.
17contracts ( ˙ P, in Table 2), using the 21 observations for 1977-1997. The two bottom
lines plot b Dn for the same period when COLA is included and excluded (columns 7
and 13, respectively, in Table 2). A strong positive relation between inﬂation and the
test-statistics is suggested. This can be conﬁrmed using an OLS regression of b Dn on a
constant and ˙ P. We ran this regression for the whole sample, including and excluding
COLA adjustments, and for sub-samples deﬁned over the private and public sectors and
long and short contracts. Interest in the public/private sector split arises because of
the vast literature dealing with diﬀerences in the wage-determination process in the two
sectors and because of the ﬁnding, noted earlier, that wage cuts were more prevalent in
the public sector. The split between short and long contracts is useful because Fortin
(1996) and others have examined ﬁrst-year wage change only which, in the case of short
contracts, is essentially the same as our own deﬁnition. Thus, the sample split along
duration lines provides a link with other studies in the area. The slope coeﬃcient in each
of these regression equations is positive and almost always signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, suggesting that, as inﬂation moderates, b Dn declines.26 We conclude, therefore,
that the accumulation of mass at zero is statistically signiﬁcant and that this is all the
more so when inﬂation subsides. As already noted, this is an indication of absolute,
rather than relative, rigidity.
In the next sub-section we analyze in a more tractable way the probability of wage
cuts and freezes and its dependence on the rate of inﬂation using limited dependent
variable models. In light of the virtual absence of wage cuts from this sample we do not
attempt to estimate multinomial models and our results continue to deal with absolute
rigidity.
26These results are not reported in order to conserve space but they are available on request.
184.3. Probability of Non-Positive Wage Adjustment
We estimate Probit and Tobit models with the view to calculating the probability Φ(·)
of a positive adjustment and 1 − Φ(·) of a non-positive (generally a wage freeze) ad-
justment and the dependence of these probabilities on the rate of inﬂation. Here, Φ
is the cumulative standard normal distribution. We estimate three simple models: In
‘Probit 1’, the index equals unity if nominal wage adjustment is positive and it is zero
otherwise. We use the entire sample of 10,945 observations and treat the 102 observa-
tions involving wage cuts as freezes. In ‘Probit 2’, we exclude the 102 observations, in
which case the probit index equals zero for wage freezes only. Finally, we estimate a
Tobit model using only the 10,843 non-negative observations. All equations include a
constant, ˙ P, the provincial unemployment rate, ten industry and ﬁve regional eﬀects.
Abbreviated results appear in Table3 . T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t eh a sac o e ﬃcient
which is negative and signiﬁcant while the inﬂation rate has a coeﬃcient which is positive
and signiﬁcant. Signiﬁcant industry and regional eﬀects are also present. The positive
coeﬃcient on the inﬂation variable suggests that, as inﬂation moderates, the probability
of a non-positive wage adjustment, which is calculated as 1 − Φ(Xˆ β) in the Probit
models and 1−Φ(Xˆ β/ˆ σ) in the Tobit model, increases. Here, ˆ β is the estimated vector
of coeﬃcients in Table 3 and ˆ σ is the estimated standard deviation of the error term
in the Tobit model. We evaluate these probabilities at the mean values of all variables
except the inﬂation rate, which we allow to range from zero to 10% and plot them in
Figure 3. The three models produce similar proﬁles which are extremely close to each
other.27 The probability of a non-positive adjustment is less than 5% at the mean rate
of ˙ P of about 5%. This is remarkably low but exactly what our earlier analysis and
Figure 1 would suggest. This probability increases steeply as the inﬂation rate declines
27Standard errors can be calculated using the delta method and they would be small given the ﬁt-
Greene (2000, p. 824). We do not report them in Figure 3 as that would confuse the presentation.
19and it is around 25-30% at rates of inﬂation between 1-2% such as those prevailing
during the low-inﬂation period. That is, freezes become ﬁv et i m e sa sl i k e l yi nt h el o w
than in the medium inﬂation period. The probability of a freeze or cut is essentially
zero at the rates of inﬂation prevailing in the high-inﬂation era.
5. Conclusion
To the extent that downward nominal rigidity is present, it is more likely to be preva-
lent in the union sector. Accordingly, we use data from collective bargaining agreements
reached in Canada between 1976 and 1999 to study the implied wage-change distribu-
tions using a variety of techniques and tests. A number of interesting conclusions emerge
though it should be stressed that the results summarized below may not generalize to
the economy at large.
The period under study may be divided into sub-periods of high (1976-82), medium
(1983-90) and very low inﬂation (1991-99). In the high-inﬂation period, the wage-change
distributions contain no spikes at zero, have left and right-hand tails which contain
about the same mass and tend to be symmetric. In the low-inﬂation period the picture
is decidedly diﬀerent: To begin with, very substantial spikes at zero are in evidence, the
most pronounced of which, in 1993, has mass in excess of 50%. In addition, the left-hand
tail including zero, is signiﬁcantly heavier than the right-hand tail that serves as the
no-rigidity counterfactual. During the medium inﬂation period, when the inﬂation rate
is halved, spikes at zero begin to appear, mass begins to concentrate in the left-hand
tail and the distributions for some years are asymmetric. Looking at all these results
in the context of a non-parametric test-statistic which compares the left and right-hand
tails of the wage-change distribution, this statistic is systematically related to the rate
of inﬂa t i o n-s e eF i g u r e2 .A si n ﬂation decreases during the 1990s, mass in the left-hand
tail, including zero, becomes signiﬁcantly larger than mass found in the right-hand tail.
20In the context of the contract data, where virtually no wage cuts can be identiﬁed,
this suggests that signiﬁcant absolute downward nominal rigidity emerged during low-
inﬂation periods. It should be stressed that these are periods when the inﬂation rate in
Canada was exceptionally low - in the range of 0.16-2.16%.
Since only 102 observations out of the 10,945 entailed wage reductions, these may be
ignored or designated as freezes and Probit and Tobit models may then be estimated.
These suggest that the probability of a freeze is zero in the high inﬂation period, around
5% in the medium inﬂation era and around 25-30% in the more recent period of low
inﬂation.
Our results shed light on the inﬂation as ‘grease’ hypothesis. Absolute (i.e. spikes
at zero), rather than relative (i.e. thinning of the tail below zero), downward nominal
rigidity is very much in evidence in the contract data. By contrast, we can report little
evidence of real wage rigidity. The incidence of real wage reductions was high during the
high-inﬂation period and it remained high even as inﬂation abated. In the low-inﬂation
period, real wage reductions were frequent because of the substantial concentration of
mass at exactly zero, just lower than the average rate of CPI inﬂation. Nevertheless,
the magnitude of real wage reductions during the low-inﬂation period (around 1-2%)
was considerably lower than that experienced during the high-inﬂation period (around
10-12%). Thus, the degree of real wage re-alig n m e n tt h a tc o u l db ea c h i e v e db yd e f a u l t
(i.e. through a nominal wage freeze) during the low-inﬂation period was modest. This
suggests that unless real wage realignment is less needed in low-inﬂation periods, the
labour market for the agents studied may not be functioning as smoothly as in periods
of higher inﬂation. Could such ineﬃciencies be responsible for some unemployment?
This is essentially the position in Fortin (1996) but our paper is not focussed on this
particular point.
It should be noted that the results above are independent of the indexation provisions
in these collective bargaining agreements. Indexation mutes both absolute and relative
21downward nominal rigidity but its eﬀects are very modest. The results, in Table 2
and Figure 2, are very similar whether cost-of-living adjustments are included in the
deﬁnition of the wage-change variable or not.
When the results are broken down by sector (public and private) and length of
contract (one year or less and ever one year), tail behaviour is not substantially aﬀected.
There is evidence that, when nominal wage cuts were attained, this was much more
likely to happen in the public sector, when suﬃciently powerful governments could
countenance the morale and other problems associated with such actions. This is a
surprising conclusion which underscores the pervasiveness of downward nominal wage
rigidity in the private sector. Also of interest is evidence in the contract data for 1993
and 1994 (the only years with noteworthy wage cuts) that where nominal wages were
reduced, subsequent contract adjustments were above those achieved in contracts with
freezes and (in 1994 only) indeed wage increases, thereby muting the impact of these
reductions.
This rather strong form of downward nominal rigidity in the base wage rates of
collective bargaining agreements cannot be dismissed on the grounds that it emanates
from data inaccuracies. Changes in beneﬁts could, of course, produce more ﬂexibility
but beneﬁt packages are costly to change and, as Lebow, Stockton and Wilson (1999)
h a v es h o w ni nad i ﬀerent context, this issue is not decisive. Wage drift, overtime premia
and other internal adjustments undoubtedly provide added ﬂexibility in some cases,
though these are diﬃcult to take into account. It is likely that the formal and informal
agreements that prevail in the non-union sector entail more ﬂexibility but good panel
data for Canada are not available over a long period of time. Thus, contract data remain
a valuable source of information about the impact of exceptional decreases in the rate
of inﬂation on wage behaviour.
226. Appendix
The test statistic b Dn is the diﬀerence of the empirical distribution function of wage
change, x, above 2×Medianand at and below 0. Under the null hypothesis, observations
in the right-hand tail will occur with the same probability as observations in the left-
hand tail and the test statistic will be centered around zero. Let Fn(x) be the empirical
distribution function based on the sample of n observations on x and use as an estimate





a )], where nx denotes observations up
to and including the point x. The function K(.) is the kernel function, a known density
symmetric about zero, and a = an is a sequence of smoothing parameters (bandwidths)
such that an approaches zero as the sample size n approaches inﬁnity. We use the
standard normal density as our kernel. We deﬁne the test statistic b Dn as
b Dn =[ 1− Fn(2medx)] − Fn(0)


















where n2medx and n0 denote the number of observations up to and including the
point of twice the median and of zero respectively. The distribution of b Dn b a s e do nt h e
comparison of two population proportions is straightforward to construct and follows
the standard normal variate. Thus, standard critical values apply. The smoothing
parameter is chosen as an = sxn− 1
α,w h e r esx denotes the standard deviation of the
sample data. Note that the values of the bandwidth are diﬀerent for each sample
analysed as they depend on the particular sample size n and on the standard deviation
sx. Thus for sx =2 ,α=8 , and n =3 0 0 ,a n =0 .98,w h i l e ,f o rn = 600, an =
230.89. In standard density estimation, α =5is usually chosen. However, evidence from
simulations by Ahmad and Li (1997) suggest a larger value of α than 5, since using the
latter results in test statistics that tend to reject the null hypothesis of symmetry too
often. A larger value of α results in greater smoothing. Hence, we present results, based
on the normal kernel, for α =8 .N o t eb Dn is two-tailed and that rejections in favour of
negative values of b Dn would signify evidence that the tail at and below zero dominates
the tail above the point 2 × Median.T h e s i g n i ﬁcance of such rejections for absolute
rigidity is examined in the main text.
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29Table 1
Number of Contracts by Year, Sector, Contract Length and ˙ W Sign
Sector Duration3 C ˙ PI Sign of ˙ W (incl. COLA)
Total Private Public Long Short ˙ W<0 ˙ W =0 ˙ W>0
19771 226 94 132 125 101 7.55 2 224
1978 673 310 363 373 300 8.01 673
1979 569 228 341 415 154 8.95 569
1980 520 242 278 407 113 9.13 520
1981 450 195 255 309 141 10.16 1 449
1982 562 206 356 282 280 12.43 1 3 558
1983 643 207 436 296 347 10.8 4 26 613
1984 676 284 392 425 251 5.86 1 61 614
1985 519 201 318 394 125 4.3 1 26 492
1986 551 247 304 449 102 3.96 2 24 525
1987 557 254 303 450 107 4.18 17 540
1988 556 264 292 484 72 4.34 4 552
1989 493 174 319 426 67 4.05 493
1990 547 278 269 462 85 4.99 14 533
1991 530 201 329 386 144 4.76 2 57 471
1992 632 213 419 450 182 5.62 7 82 543
1993 516 204 312 445 71 1.49 18 263 235
1994 471 186 285 399 72 1.86 53 186 232
1995 460 178 282 390 70 0.16 9 162 289
1996 448 194 254 382 66 2.16 3 164 281
19972 346 207 139 292 54 1.62 1 50 295
Total 10945 4567 6378 8041 2904 102 1142 9701
Notes: 1Includes 1976 contracts.
2Includes 1998 and 1999 contracts.
3Long contracts have duration longer than one year.Table 2
Descriptive and Test1 Statistics
Wage Change Includes COLA Wage Change Excludes COLA
·
P M R WS D R WM e d i a nM e a nS k e wc Dn M R WS D R WM e d i a nM e a nS k e wc Dn
19772 9.58 -0.90 2.75 8.20 8.69 0.57 -0.09 -3.10 2.60 6.70 6.48 0.21 -0.80
1978 9.93 -1.81 2.70 7.42 8.16 1.30 1.02 -2.82 2.75 6.78 7.12 1.11 0.62
1979 11.53 -0.91 3.01 10.09 10.64 1.26 0.45 -3.11 3.74 8.63 8.41 0.21 0.36
1980 12.23 0.17 3.03 11.94 12.39 0.71 0.13 -1.04 3.35 11.03 11.15 -0.06 0.30
1981 9.51 4.14 3.38 13.09 13.64 1.03 0.12 3.27 3.98 12.87 12.76 -0.16 -0.09
1982 5.93 4.39 3.01 10.63 10.31 -0.01 -0.44 3.93 3.47 10.02 9.85 -0.25 -1.35
1983 4.46 0.44 2.67 5.00 4.89 0.60 -1.67 0.02 2.81 5.00 4.47 0.16 -4.83
1984 4.16 -0.40 1.87 4.00 3.76 -0.17 -4.44 -0.69 2.03 3.82 3.45 0.02 -6.03
1985 4.35 -0.56 2.17 4.04 3.78 -1.44 -2.34 -0.90 2.26 3.79 3.44 -1.12 -3.43
1986 4.41 -0.76 1.84 4.09 3.65 -0.07 -2.48 -0.97 1.90 3.76 3.44 0.08 -2.88
1987 4.65 -0.75 1.76 3.82 3.90 0.83 -1.29 -1.09 1.92 3.40 3.56 0.83 -2.33
1988 5.16 -0.24 1.78 4.89 4.92 1.44 0.03 -0.56 1.99 4.68 4.61 1.00 -0.79
1989 5.01 0.68 1.87 5.22 5.68 1.84 0.54 0.42 1.95 5.12 5.41 1.39 0.53
1990 3.90 1.88 2.16 5.77 5.79 0.47 -0.90 1.53 2.34 5.65 5.43 0.29 -1.58
1991 1.50 2.39 2.19 4.82 3.89 0.15 -5.20 2.20 2.20 3.90 3.69 0.28 -5.76
1992 1.50 0.66 1.68 2.00 2.16 0.40 -5.07 0.61 1.70 1.97 2.11 0.37 -5.69
1993 1.14 -0.39 1.41 0.00 0.75 1.00 n/a -0.49 1.30 0.00 0.65 0.90 n/a
1994 1.80 -1.20 1.75 0.00 0.60 -0.79 n/a -1.29 1.71 0.00 0.51 -0.77 n/a
1995 1.56 -0.69 1.20 0.68 0.86 1.98 -11.72 -0.74 1.15 0.68 0.82 1.99 -12.91
1996 1.62 -0.42 1.32 0.86 1.22 0.66 -10.20 -0.51 1.27 0.76 1.14 0.78 -10.55
19972 1.72 0.14 1.33 1.87 1.87 0.16 -4.94 0.03 1.29 1.71 1.76 0.07 -4.96
Notes: 1 c Dn =[ 1− Fn(2 · Median)] − F(0) is asymptotically normal. F is the empirical distribution function. Only values for
α =8are reported, those for α =1 0are similar. MRW is the mean and SDRW the standard deviation of real wage change.
2 Contracts for 1976 and 1977 have been merged into ‘1977’ and those for 1997 to 1999 into ‘1997’.Table 3
Modelling the Incidence of Positive Wage Adjustment3
Probit 1 Probit 2 Tobit
coeﬀ coeﬀ/st. error coeﬀ coeﬀ/st. error coeﬀ coeﬀ/st. error
Constant 1.23 8.45 1.23 8.28 2.23 10.31
˙ P 0.41 29.48 0.40 28.37 0.94 98.37
Region Unemp. Rate -0.16 -13.55 -0.16 -13.07 -0.26 -16.04
Industry Eﬀects1 yes yes yes
Regional Eﬀects2 yes yes yes
σ 2.88 136.91
# Observ. 10945 10843 10843
# Pos. Observ. 9701 9701 9701
Log. Likel. -2681 -2543 -25071
Notes: 1 Eleven industries are distinguished.
2 Six regions are distinguished.
3For Probit equations, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if wage adjustment is positive and is coded
as zero otherwise. For Tobit, zeroes are as in Probit and actual wage adjustment is used when positive.Figure 2 
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